Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Anthony W. Rudman v. Evelyn W. Rudman : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul H. Liapis; Gustin, Green, Stegall and Liapis; attorneys for plaintiff.
Clark W. Sessions, Dean C. Andreasen; Campbell Maack and Sessions; attorneys for defendant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Rudman v. Rudman, No. 890475 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2085

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

£#nito>»

UTAH

50
.r- v'i
DOCKET NO.

VWft-cAUTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ANTHONY W. RUDMAN,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,

Case No. 890475-CA

vs.
EVELYN W. RUDMAN,

Priority No. 14.D.

Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
EVELYN W. RUDMAN
APPEAL FROM THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED ON
JULY 3, 1989, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE <XUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON PRESIDING

CLARK W. SESSIONS
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
Attorneys for Defendant,
Appellant and CrossRespondent
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
PAUL H. LIAPIS
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Respondent and CrossAppellant
48 Post Office Place, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996

$€t*l 1990
COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ANTHONY W. RUDMAN,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,

Case No. 890475-CA

vs.
EVELYN W. RUDMAN,

Priority No. 14.b.

Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
EVELYN W. RUDMAN
APPEAL FROM THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED ON
JULY 3, 1989, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON PRESIDING

CLARK W. SESSIONS
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
Attorneys for Defendant,
Appellant and CrossRespondent
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
PAUL H. LIAPIS
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Respondent and CrossAppellant
48 Post Office Place, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

ARGUMENT

1

POINT I

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF ALIMONY
AWARDED

1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CHARACTERIZATION AND DETERMINATION OF THE
VALUE OF CERTAIN MARITAL PROPERTY

3

POINT III THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY FAILING TO AWARD MRS. RUDMAN HER
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPERT WITNESS
FEES

5

CONCLUSION

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

8

210203J.PL2

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150
(Utah 1981)

3

Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990)

5

Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615
(Utah Ct. App. 1988)

2

STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) (1989)

210203J.PL2

ii

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
All supplemental statements of fact are included in the
argument below.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF ALIMONY AWARDED
Mr. Rudman argues in his brief that "the findings are adequate
in light of the fact that there was sufficient evidence before the
trial court to make a proper determination of alimony."

Brief of

Respondent, at 9. The Findings of Fact as found by the trial court
are, however, void of such elementary findings as:
1.

The amount of Mr. Rudman's income;

2.

The amount of Mrs. Rudman's income; and

3.

The amount of Mrs. Rudman's reasonable needs.

The evidence is uncont rover ted that Mrs. Rudman had reasonable
monthly living expenses in the amount of $2,853.23.

Defendant's

Exhibit 102.
The evidence presented by the parties relative to their
respective monthly incomes is, however, controverted. For example,
Mr. Rudman presented evidence and now argues that his average
monthly net income after deductions for federal and state income
taxes and FICA taxes was $2,184.89.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Mrs.

Rudman presented evidence that Mr. Rudman had cash income before
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taxes for the years 1982 through 1988 of at least $64,791 and as
high as $141,876 per year.

Defendant's Exhibit 118.

Similarly, Mrs. Rudman presented evidence that established
that she had not earned more than $6,000.00 per year from any of
her business ventures.

Defendant's Exhibit

101.

Mr. Rudman

attempts to establish through Plaintiff's Exhibit 113 that Mrs.
Rudman had monthly income of $2,868.01. Such an attempt is grossly
misplaced for the reason that Plaintiff's Exhibit 113 represents
only the computation of the monthly average deposit amount to Mrs.
Rudman's personal checking account. Such deposits do not represent
earned income but rather the use by Mrs. Rudman of a portion of her
$195,000.00 of pre-marital liquid income-producing assets. Vol. V,
p. 6-8.

Such use was required by Mrs. Rudman because Mr. Rudman

refused to support her during the marriage.
Relative to an award of alimony, this Court has stated:
. . . the trial court must make findings on
all material issues, and such findings must be
sufficiently detailed and consist of enough
subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court
took to reach its conclusion on each factual
issue presented. Failure to substantiate such
findings constitutes reversible error unless
the
facts
in the record
are
"clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only
a finding in favor of the judgment."
(Citations omitted).
Sampinos v. Sampinos. 750 P.2d 615, 617 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The evidence relative to the income of the parties is controverted
and capable of supporting different findings.

Accordingly, this

case must be remanded to the trial court for more specific findings
2

on the three elements the trial court must consider in setting an
award of alimony.

Only then can this Court properly review the

award of alimony made by the trial court.
Mr. Rudman also argues that the trial court's award of alimony
for a period of approximately five years constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
years.

Mr. Rudman claims that the marriage lasted only six

The parties were married on April 18, 1981, and the Decree

of Divorce was entered on July 3, 1989, a period of over eight
years.
skills,

Given Mrs. Rudman's age, lack of education, training and
poor

physical

condition,

and

most

importantly,

the

permanent alimony she gave up and the substantial base of her premarital income-producing assets that had to be used during the
marriage, it is only equitable that this Court award permanent
alimony in the amount of $2,853.00 per month to terminate on the
occurrence of any event provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)
(1989).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
CHARACTERIZATION AND DETERMINATION OF
THE VALUE OF CERTAIN MARITAL PROPERTY
Mr. Rudman correctly states the principle of Utah law that an
appellate court will reverse the trial court "only when the trial
court's finding is against the pure weight of evidence." Jensen v.
Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981).

This case is precisely the

situation where the pure weight of the evidence is contrary to the
trial court's determination•
210203J.PL2
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The first error of the trial court was the mischaracterization
of certain loans from the Rudmans in the amount of $269,704 to
certain of Mr. Rudman's business entities.

As Mrs. Rudman's

expert, Merrill Norman, testified, the loans receivable were not
present prior to the marriage and could not be traced to any
specific premarital asset.

Vol. V, p. 192-3.

Mr. Rudman did not present evidence specifically tracing the
loans receivable or any part thereof to any premarital asset.

He

also withheld documents and information from Mr. Norman which would
have allowed the tracing to be performed.

The clear weight of the

evidence can support no conclusion other than that the loans
receivable constitute property jointly accumulated by the Rudmans
during the marriage. As marital property, the loans receivable are
subject to division.
Similarly, the weight of the evidence can only support the
finding

that

Mrs.

Rudman

paid

approximately

$26,898

for

improvements to and the furnishing of two condominiums and the
Scofield cabin.

Defendant's Exhibit 117.

Try as he may, Mr.

Rudman cannot and did not rebut this evidence.

The trial court

abused its discretion by failing to consider this evidence in
fashioning an equitable property settlement.
Mr. Rudman's brief attempts to respond to the points raised in
Mrs. Rudman's brief as to the value of other marital property which
was improperly excluded by the trial court.

Mrs. Rudman does not

need to reiterate in this brief the errors, misplaced assumptions
210203J.PL2
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and improper methodology used by Mr. Rudman's expert in the
valuation of the cinemas. It must be reiterated, however, that the
trial court improperly excluded or improperly valued property worth
in excess of $472,589 from the marital estate.

The facts and the

law dictate that this property be included in the marital estate
and be subject to division.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BT FAILING TO AWARD MRS. RUDMAN HER
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPERT WITNESS FEES
In his brief, Mr. Rudman argues that Mrs. Rudman failed to
meet her burden for an award of attorney's fees.
met

by

the

moving

party

establishing

That burden is

financial

need

and

demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount of the award. Munns
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Mr.

Rudman

argues

that Mrs. Rudman was

sufficient in value to pay her attorney's fees.

awarded

assets

However, those

assets, a home and automobile, are not liquid and cannot be
liquidated without placing Mrs. Rudman in further financial peril.
Mr. Rudman further argues that Mrs. Rudman squandered her cash
during the marriage.

Mrs. Rudman did not squander her cash, but

rather, as stated by Mr. Rudman in his brief, used her cash to
purchase a home, a business and a vehicle. Brief of Respondent, at
28-29. Such are necessities that Mrs. Rudman had the good sense to
purchase so that she would have shelter, transportation and the
means to partially support herself. Had Mrs. Rudman not taken such
210203J.PL2
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precautions, Mr. Rudman would be paying substantially more by way
of alimony for these necessities required by Mrs. Rudman.

Because

Mrs. Rudman took prudent action, she should not be penalized by the
trial court for failing to maintain a cash reserve sufficient to
pay for her attorney's fees and costs.
Mr. Rudman also argues that Mrs. Rudman's attorney's fees were
exorbitant.

Such an argument flies in the face of the fact that

the trial court made no finding as to the reasonableness of the
attorney's fees.
Mr. Rudman further argues that the issue of contempt was never
addressed at trial. Such an assertion is false. The pleadings and
the transcript clearly reflect that additional attorney's fees and
costs were incurred by Mrs. Rudman due to the fact that orders to
show cause and motions to compel discovery had to be filed against
Mr. Rudman.

Vol. V, p. 214-221.

Even though the trial court may

not have specifically addressed the contempt

of Mr. Rudman's

actions, the trial court certainly had the equitable authority to
award attorney's fees and costs that were incurred due to the fact
that such actions had to be taken by Mrs. Rudman.
The trial court's failure to award Mrs. Rudman her attorney
and expert witness fees is inequitable. The trial court's failure
to rule on the reasonableness of the fees constitutes reversible
error.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the facts of this case and the law, this Court
should:
1.

Reverse the trial court's award of alimony and award

permanent alimony in the amount of $2,853.00.
2.

Reverse the trial court's award of property and award

Mrs. Rudman the additional amount of $236,295.00 to equalize the
distribution of the marital estate.
3.

Reverse the trial court's failure to award attorney's and

expert witness fees and award Mrs. Rudman the amount of $55,500.00
for her fees.
JJs j~ day of September, 1990.

Respectfully submitted this

CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

•^L&rt.

^c/tUCa^t

Clark W. Sessions
Dean C. Andreasen
Attorneys for Evelyn W. Rudman
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